• This book won the International Booker Prize 2025.

    I found this collection of stories challenging. First, obviously, I am not familiar with the social and religious backgrounds of these stories. So, I frequently had to look up words to create an (imperfect) understanding of the situation. However, this is not at all a point that should prevent people from reading this book. Quite the opposite. It is one of its strengths. Secondly, I am more attuned to reading novels. When doing this, readers have 300 or 400 pages to get to know the characters and the plot. In Banyu Mushtaq’s Heart Lamp, readers have only 214 pages, but they must delve into twelve very different social situations with different characters (the leading roles are mostly female) and different approaches. They range from the sad to the comical, from relentless and heart-wrenching realism and desperation to the grotesque and to the challenges of different kinds of everyday life with the demands, obligations, expectations, and failures that, though unavoidable, bear heavily on the minds of participants. Banu Mushtaq’s rich writing style vividly brings the characters and their social situations to life, drawing readers in and encouraging them to engage deeply with both.

    On pages 209 to 214, there is an informative text by the translator.

    The first story, “Stone Slabs for Shaista Mahal,” ends with the unexplained death of Shaista Bhabhi, only a few weeks after she had a troubled birth of her seventh child. Before she gave birth, she had confided to the female narrator, Zeenat, that she wanted an operation to end future pregnancies. Zeenat cannot attend the ceremony of forty days after birth because she had to travel to see her mother, who had a serious heart attack. But she assumed that Shaista had fully recovered her good health after that birth. Zeenat’s mother dies after three days. She and her husband, Mujahid, stay for a few more days after the forty-day period of mourning and then return home. They visit Shaista’s home, noticing that the garden was unattended. They wait at the house since nobody seems at home. Eventually, Shaista’s husband comes out of her room. Zeenat asks, “Where is my Shaista Bhabhi?” Her husband answers, “She is no more. Before we could understand what happened, she had gone very far away from us.” (I am inclined to detect some sadness and bewilderment about what had happened to him in his statement.) Right after the forty-day period of mourning, he married a young girl from a poor family. After all, he had to take care of seven children. Though Shaista’s death is not explained, readers can safely assume that this death was altogether avoidable had she not given birth to so many children and earlier undergone the operation to prevent future pregnancies.

    In the second story, “Fire Rain,” readers encounter a mutawalli, who oversees a charitable Muslim endowment. He lives with his wife and children near a mosque. One of his children is sick, cared for by his wife, Arifa. He is stressed because his youngest sister wants a piece of family property. Meanwhile, many people come to his house for help; election candidates visit him because they think he can deliver them the Muslim vote; a mother comes to ask him for help with a hospital bill for one of her children. Then, a big problem occurs: A corpse is discovered in a pond. It is assumed to be a Muslim man who had disappeared some time ago. His widow identifies the cloth as being his. The police do not care; they bury him in a Hindu cemetery. Of course, this causes a major upheaval in the Muslin community. A Muslim man buried without Muslim rites in a Hindu cemetery! A big effort results in the corpse being exhumed and brought in a procession to the Muslim cemetery. Just before the procession reaches it, the supposedly dead man turns up totally drunk and shouting obscenities at the people in the procession. After burying the corpse anyway, the mutawalli returns home. At this point, the story returns to its beginning. A daughter tells him that his wife has brought their small son to the hospital. His persistent fever for two weeks turned out to be meningitis. I was undecided about what was more comical, the stressed mutawalli, the fuss about the corpse in the wrong cemetery, being blown up to a matter of religious life and death, or the supposedly dead man turning up alive, though totally drunk.

    The third story, “Black Cobras,” lacks any of the comical elements of the second text. “Black Cobra” is relentlessly realistic and heart-wrenching. The main characters are Aashraf (and her three daughters), Yakub (her husband and autorickshaw driver), and a mutawalli (a different one from the preceding story). After Aashraf gave birth to her third daughter (Munni), Yakub left her to marry another woman. He wanted a son who could take over his autorickshaw in the future. This might not have bothered his wife a lot. But he did not pay for her and her daughters’ (who were also his daughters, alas!) living expenses. Worse, he did not help with the medical expenses of sick Munni. His behavior had thrown Aashraf  and her daughters into abject poverty. In her desperation, she wrote dozens of petitions to the mosque committee and the mutawalli, asking them to use Islamic law to force her husband to pay for their cost of living. Yet, the mosque committee kept silent and Yakub bribed the mutawalli. When they finally meet Aashraf at the mosque, Yakub violently kicks her. When she falls to the ground, she cannot hold on to Munni who flies out of her hands and dies on impact. At the end of this story, the mutawalli’s wife, Amina, gets on her way to have an operation done to prevent future pregnancies (she already has seven children). Earlier in the story, Amina had complained to her husband about how hard the frequent pregnancies were on her. She asked him, “If I bear one child per year, what will I become? Don’t you want me to live long enough to be a mother to these children at least?” That is, not to share the fate of Shaista from the first story. Yet, her husband cared more for his personal positional reputation than for his wife’s welfare (and by implication for the welfare of their children), saying, “I am the mutawalli; if people get to know that I got the operation done for a woman in my own house, I will have to be answerable to them, hamm.”

    On the grimly realistic narration of the third story follows a domestic triangle of sorts in “A Decision of the Heart.” Akhila had born four sons to Yusuf, the owner of a well-established fruit shop. Yet, the marital peace is seriously disturbed by the fact that Yusuf’s mother, Mehaboob Bi, also lives in the house, though in a different section. Yusuf is his mother’s only child, and so he feels obliged to care for her in her old age, especially as she had been an exceptionally loving mother. From the beginning of their marriage, Akhila hated this arrangement. One day, early in their marriage, the wife and husband fought so badly that her brothers came to the house and beat Yusuf up. Akhira screamed at him, “You should have kept her! What did you marry me for?” Before that, she had cried, “You are making my stomach burn by behaving like a co-wife.” Yusuf tried to talk sense to her, to no avail. Readers might assume that Akhira’s heavily exaggerated jealousy indicates a stylistic choice of the author, making Akhira’s behavior almost look like a satirical performance. Eventually, Yusuf gets into a challenge with his wife. He agrees to find a new husband for his mother (without telling her). He employes a professional matchmaker, and after some trying, they identify an appropriate candidate who is willing to marry Mehaboob Bi. Suddenly, Akhira’s behavior changes entirely. She even invites community elders to her house to give testimony to her “foolishness.” Her performance on this occasion is complete with plenty of “tears pouring down her face.” Seeing this change in the behavior of his wife, “Yusuf was shocked. Was this … this was Akhira?” At some point, his mother starts speaking to the community elders, her son, and her daughter-in-law, accepting the arrangement that Yusuf had initiated. Yusuf, “very softly said, ‘Akhira, may you also have the good fortune of having your children arrange your wedding.’ And spat out enough bitterness for a lifetime.”

    In the story “Soft Whispers,” the young female first-person narrator is woken up by a phone call from her mother. Since the family manages an important shrine, she wants her daughter to represent the family by taking part in the sandalwood ritual of the annual Urs festival. The caretaker named Abid would see her to make arrangements. The daughter asks her mother to ask him to see her in one hour. This brings her memory back to the time of her eighth birthday when she played with a large group of other kids in the village. Leading these kids was a tall boy, about fifteen-sixteen years old. His name was Abid. At first, the group played in a yard with many trees, trying to capture sparrows. Later, they moved to a pond in which the boys swam, while she was sitting on a rock. At one point, Abid moved her to another rock and kissed her on the cheek. Growing up, this same Abid became the caretaker and guru of the family’s shrine. Now, she waits for him to meet him. She wonders, “Would he be as rough as he was as a boy, would he have acquired a holy glow, or would he have a deceitful look on he face?” When he enters the room, she asks him, “Do you remember, Abid?” But he looks down to the floor, respectfully addressing her as “Apa,” only asking her to attend the festival on a given day. She still wonders about the boy he once was, but he does not give her an opportunity to find out, strictly keeping his eyes fixed on the ground.

    Like “Black Cobra,” “Red Lungi” is a realistic story. However, the perspectives adopted could hardly be more different. “Black Cobra” is written from the perspective of Aashraf and her three daughters, who are left by husband and father, pushing them into abject poverty and hunger. She fights for her rights against entirely unresponsive and even corrupt religious personnel. In “Red Lungi,” Razia faces very different problems. Hers is a very well-off family. Now, the summer vacation begins, and since her husband, Latif Ahmad, is the core of a big family, his house is used for family functions. In practice, this means that eighteen children will live in that house during the summer period. Razia has an idea that might lessen her burden (though it first requires a lot of preparation): She determines that six boys are qualified for Circumcisions that will be done by the local barber, who is also a professional in doing this. Since large amounts of cloth is left over after the ceremonial lungi are prepared, Razia opens the ceremony at a local mosque for people who do not have the means to arrange for the circumcision of their boys on their own. Thus, in the end, this becomes a mass event whose procedure is narrated in great detail. That there are poor people is obvious from the approach Razia adopts; she is even surprised at how poorly the son of her own cook is dressed, giving him one of the many sets of cloth that was given to her son when both attended the same circumcision. Yet, in the end, this remains a kind but charitable act by the female head of a rich household who had many different worries managing it, including the post-circumcision hospitalization of her own son, and her worries about his health.  

    In “Heart Lamp,” the sixth story, readers encounter Mehrun. Sixteen years earlier, she was a happy second-year BCom student learning for the exam. Then, her family destroyed her dreams by having her marry Inayat. Mehrun begged her parents to let her continue her studies. To no avail. Thereby, she was forced into the female role of mother, getting as many children as possible (which is a prominent theme in the preceding stories). Now she had five children, including a baby that she still breast-fed. Mehrun “had been dice in Inayat’s games of love and lust for sixteen years. And after sixteen years, he had then insulted her womanhood. ‘You lie like a corpse. What happiness did I get from you?’” “Her only claim to importance was that she was the mother of his children.” In fact, Inayat had already started a relationship with a hospital nurse, threatening to push through a divorce according to Islamic law. This is one reason why her family is so appalled and has taken the side of Mehrun’s husband rather than that of her daughter: This has become a matter of the family’s honor, and the prospects of her younger sisters to find husbands. Mehrun feels that the only way out is by committing suicide. She has already doused herself in kerosine, holding a box of matches in her hand, when her eldest daughter, Salma, who studies for taking the SSLC exam (completion of secondary schooling at the end of grade 10), discovers her in the yard of the house. “Salma was still clutching her mother’s legs. ‘Ammi,’ she was saying, ‘Just because you have lost one person, you will throw all of us at that woman’s mercy? You are ready to die for Abba, but is it not possible for you to live for our sakes? How can you make us all orphans, Ammi? We want you.’ But more than her words, it was Salma’s touch that affected her.”

    The main characters in “High-Heeled Shoes” are two couples, Nayaz Khan and his wife Asifa, and his brother Mehaboob Khan and his wife Naseema. Supporting characters, so to speak, is a pair of high-heel shoes worn by Naseema and a mango tree, which has since decades provided fruit, pleasure, and memories to those living in their family home. The present inhabitants are Nayaz and Asifa, while Mehaboob and Naseema live in Saudi Arabia and only occasionally visit their hometown. On one of these visits, Naseema wears a pair of high-heel shoes. As soon as Nayaz sees them a grotesque obsession befalls his mind: His wife Asifa should also wear such shoes. The “magical world of that one pair of shoes … always made him forget himself.” Before his brother’s subsequent visit and his wife, Nayaz thoroughly renovates their parental home. Fatefully, this also includes cutting down the much-beloved mango tree in the yard to make way for building shop-space for rent. When Arifa saw that, she “watched from the window and shed copious tears,” though her few memories “were so few she could have pickled them all in a single jar.” Mehaboob, whom his brother had not informed about his plans, showed a much stronger reaction. After all, he had grown up with that mango tree. “His heart broke. He did not shed tears. But he became a sea of tears himself. Not a word came out of his mouth, though he himself collapsed.” “His thoughts painfully oscillated between wondering whether he should pat his brother’s back for all the things he had done, or insult him for building a tomb over his memories.” During that visit, Nayaz sees precisely that kind of high-heel shoes he was so obsessed with in a local shop. Though he bought them, the whole thing becomes a fiasco because Asifa’s feet do not fit into the shoes, although he forces her to wear them. There is one paragraph in the story where the author does not narrate the story but rather criticizes a social world based on materialism and consumerism. “Material things had become priceless, and human beings worthless,” which reflected the way Nayaz ignored the needs of his pregnant wife and her way of life, instead following his grotesque obsession. “Aha! The golden deer is more than roaming about, it is making everyone mad too. It has brought everyone under its spell. The tale of its magnetism—no one could grasp it in their hands—this was the grand mark of civilization!”

    When Shameen Banu (“A Taste of Heaven”) moved in with the family of her husband, Saadat, “the sky of limitless expectations [could be seen] in her eyes.” Soon enough, though, she encountered the realities of living as an in-law in the huge family of her husband. The social demands were overpowering, and “Her own dreams withered away.” She tried to cope. “But as days passed by, her own pregnancies, and having to raise her [three] little children in the middle of all the other weddings, pregnancies, deliveries and confinements of her husband’s sisters, illnesses, and eventual deaths of her parents-in-law, brought her much irritation.” When a brother-in-law married, she forced him and his wife to look for accommodation elsewhere. Her relationship with her husband was under stress, especially as her behavior changed unfavorably. She became emotional and irritable, scolding her kids for nothing. And then, there was the younger sister of Saadat’s father, who everyone called Bi Dadi. It became apparent that her cognitive capacities were in decline. She joined Shameen’s children when they were meeting to discuss family affairs. One of the girls gives her Pepsi to drink telling her that it was Aab-e-kausar, sweet water from the heavenly river. Since then, Bi Dadi became addicted to Pepsi. She only drank Pepsi, the “Taste of Heaven,” and lived on in her own imagined world together with her husband, who had died only days after they were married. From the beginning of the story to its end, Saadat attributed his wife’s strangely changed behavior to the onset of menopause. He was satisfied with his personal explanation. Her behavior improved over time. Anyway, “Because of the heavenly drink, there seemed to be some peace and quiet in the house.”

    “The Shroud” has a similar structure as “Soft Whispers.” In case of the latter, it is a phone call from the mother of the protagonist that brings her to remember an episode from her childhood. In “The Shroud,” it is the son of a deceased mother who turns up at Shaziya’s house demanding from her son to hand over the kafan [the shroud used to wrap a dead body] that his mother, Shaziya, had promised to bring his mother, Yaseem Bua, from her recent Hajj. This was an urgent request, because the Islamic burial rites had to be done quickly. Shaziya had just gotten up when she encountered this exchange between Altaf (the son of the deceased woman) and Farman (her son). Her memories begin with the sentence, “Even though she didn’t want it to, her mind raced back.” To cut the story short, she (who is rich) had promised Altaf’s poor mother to bring her a kafan from her pilgrimage. Yaseen Bua had even saved money and handed it over to Shaziya before her trip. When in Mecca, she remembered her promise on and off. In the end, however, her mind became too busy with her own shopping instincts. In fact, when she bought a Turkish carpet, her husband asked the shop assistant whether they also sold kafan. So, the shop assistant brought him one. However, Shaziya’s attention was fixed on the carpet and could not be bothered to think about the kafan. Moreover, her husband found the kafan too heavy to carry both the carpet and the shroud back to their accommodation. This way, they ended up returning home without the kafan for Yaseen Bua. With her death and her son showing up at her house, this became a source of great embarrassment and sorrow. “There was no end to Shaziya’s sorrow, no drought for her tears.” Many people wondered why a rich woman could feel so much sorrow for a poor servant. “Shaziya alone knew the truth: it was not Yaseen Bua’s last rites being conducted, but her own.” Frankly, I did not understand this last sentence. Unlike in “Soft Whispers,” this ending seems to move beyond the logic of the story.

    In “The Arabic Teacher and Gobi Manchuri,” a successful female lawyer and mother of two daughters hires a man employed by the local mosque to teach Arabic to her daughters. He has a strange obsession with a certain dish—Gobi Manchuri. He disappears when the mother returns home early one day and finds him sitting in the kitchen, having her daughters prepare the dish. She never sees him again. However, from time to time, she hears that he is looking for a wife, using his teaching of her daughters as a reference. Eventually, he finds a wife. After a while, a brother of that wife brings her to meet the mother, and lawyer. His sister hardly dares opening her burkha. But she must because there is a serious reason for this visit: As obsessed as that former teacher of her daughters is with Gobi Manchuri, as intolerant he is when the dish is not prepared to his satisfaction. In fact, as is shown by the many wounds of his wife, he is prone to serious acts of domestic violence. Her brother wants the lawyer to bring this case to the attention of the police.

    “Be a Woman Once, Oh Lord!” is a very fitting conclusion of this collection of short stories. There is no need to go into details, except perhaps that Mushtaq varies a sentence that she used in “Heart Lamp”: “You lie like a corpse. What happiness did I get from you?” In the current story, this becomes “What pleasure have I got from you? Every time I touched you, you lay there like a corpse.” One is left wondering of the seemingly endless ignorance and cruelty that men are capable of when it comes to their relationship with women. Even more, these men do not seem to treat their relationships with women as relationships between human beings, but rather as relationships between human beings (the men) and thing-like creatures (the women). Banu Mushtaq uses this final story in Heart Lamp to deliver a scathing and devastating indictment of a god who, out of a mixture of male chauvinism and sheer incompetence, has created a world where women are degraded into the property of their husbands, into work slaves, sex toys, and childbearing machines.[1]

    MHN

    Nonthaburi, Thailand

    22 July 2025


    [1] The sentence “Banu … machines” was formulated with the help of ChatGPT and Deepl.

  • Harper Lee. 1989 [1960]. To Kill a Mockingbird. London: Arrow Books.

    309 pages

    Normally, I stick to reading and summarizing contemporary literature. Harper Lee’s 1960 novel To Kill a Mockingbird does not fit into this category. So, the inclusion in this series came about accidentally. I was in a Bangkok bookshop where I first stumbled over Sally Rooney’s Normal People (2018). Since her new novel, Intermezzo (2024), was already on my pile of to-read books, I thought that I might as well first read the novel that made her name. Looking a bit more at the lower levels of the shelf holding English-language novels, I saw To Kill a Mockingbird. Being an old-school German, I had only recently heard about this novel and its controversial status as reading material for seventh and eighth graders in US schools. This made me curious enough to buy the book to get an idea what the controversy was all about (racism, the “N”-word). As the cover picture above shows, the publishers certainly thought that the book was still in demand, and that a bookshop in Bangkok put it on their limited shelf space with English-language novels also demonstrated that the staff assumed that there was still demand. A quick check at the Web shop of Kinokuniya showed that it had 15 versions of the novel and a few more books about Harper Lee on sale. In short, it does seem that the book is still considered relevant today.

    The book was first published in 1960, received a Pulitzer Prize a year later, and was made into a film in 1962. Gregory Peck won an Oscar as best male actor for his portrayal of Atticus Finch. The novel is set in a small town in the U.S.’ deep South, Alabama. In the novel, this town is called Maycomb, the seat of Maycomb County. Harper Lee grew up in such a setting—Monroeville, Alabama. Her story reflects impressions from the time she was about ten years old, though she is five to eight years old in her text. It is the time of the Great Depression of the early 1930s. Even more importantly, it is the high time of racial segregation based on the “Jim Crow Laws” that were rescinded only in the mid-1960s. As a result, the white population lived in a world of their own, and the book’s story almost exclusively plays in this white social context. Maycomb’s black population lives in separate quarters. Thus, there are two socio-racial spheres that only very occasionally overlap.

    The social center of the novel is the Finch family. After his wife died, Atticus Finch, a lawyer and member of the Alabama Congress, is a single parent for his son Jem (who moves from childhood to adolescence during the story) and Jean Louise, who is mostly called “Scout” throughout the text. She does not conform to the traditional female gender role, dresses in overalls and get into fist fights with the boys. Her father does not mind this deviation from the small-town normative ideas of how a daughter should think and act. Atticus is assisted in bringing up his kids by Calpurnia, the family’s black cook, who is in her late fifties. Scout is the narrator of the story, which occasionally makes her sound wise beyond her age (already before she started school, Calpurnia and her father taught her how to read and write, which draws the ire of her first-grade teacher). Atticus is presented as a person with unshakable wisdom, but also a certain portion of naiveté. Scout and her brother are very close. They mostly do activities together. During summers, their relationship is expanded by Dill, a boy who spends this time with a relative in Maycomb. Later in the book, however, due to Jem moving into adolescence, their spheres of life increasingly grow apart.

    But the novel is not simply about a carefree childhood in a racially segregated small Alabama town in the 1930s. It is much more serious. On page 82, Scout relates that a boy at school “had announced in the school yard the day before that Scout Finch’s daddy defended niggers.” She asks her father, “Do you defend niggers, Atticus?” His answer is, “Of course I do. Don’t say nigger, Scout. That’s common” (p. 83). On page 116, Atticus tells his daughter:

    “Scout,” said Atticus, “when summer comes you’ll have to keep your head about far worse things … it’s not fair for you and Jem, I know that, but sometimes we have to make the best of things, and the way we conduct ourselves when the chips are down – well, all I can say is, when you and Jem are grown, maybe you’ll back on this with some compassion and some feeling that I didn’t let you down. This case, Tom Robinson’s case, is something that goes to the essence of a man’s conscience – Scout, I couldn’t go to church and worship God if I didn’t try to help that man.”

    “Atticus, you must be wrong …”

    “How’s that?”

    “Well, most folks seem to think they’re right and you’re wrong …”

    “They’re certainly entitled to think that, and they’re entitled to full respect for their opinions,” said Atticus, “but before I can live with other folks, I’ve got to live with myself. The one thing that doesn’t abide by majority rule is a person’s conscience.”

    What happened was that Atticus was assigned by the judge to defend a crippled black father of three who was accused by a white man to have beaten up and raped his daughter. The court procedure forms a key part of the book. After having observed the proceeding while sitting in the section for the black audience, Jem is convinced that his father has won the case. Obviously, the father had beaten up his daughter. No medical test had been done confirming that rape had indeed taken place. And the daughter must have been beaten up by a left-hander (her father is left-handed), while the accused man’s left arm was crippled and unusable. The daughter insisted that she had fought tooth and nail against her assailant. Yet, the defendant had only one arm that he could have used in committing his crime. Consequently, Jem thought that the all-wight jury had to set the accused free. Yet, after a considerable time of deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict. This would have meant death on the electric chair since rape was a capital offense in Alabama at that time.

    Atticus tries to convince Tom Robinson that an appeal would have promising prospects, given the obvious distortions in the original trial. Tom is brought to a penal camp, tries to flee, and is shot dead with 17 bullets in his body.

    After I finished reading the novel, I did what I usually do when I wanted to know what has been written about a particular subject: I opened Google Scholar. It listed 29,300 entries. Now, my main interest was reading this novel, not writing a paper of literary analysis. Nevertheless, given that the text has become controversial, I deliberately selected a handful of references and downloaded them to see what their authors had to say on this novel.

    The first text is by Dr. Girija Suri of Amity University, Gurgaon, India: “The Experience of ‘Othering’ and Possibility of Social Justice: An Analysis of Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, Veda’s. Journal of English Language and Literature, 11 (3):78-82, 2024. She emphasized “Othering” and marginalization. In her view, the novel is “a text of enduring value that exemplifies the futility of legal change if not accompanied by fundamental shift in prejudiced mindsets that sow the seeds of institutionalized ‘othering’ and oppression of those different or opposite to oneselves” (p. 79). She identifies Atticus’ court performance as a “catalytic moment in the story that propels the people in Maycomb to introspect and reflect their innate prejudices against the society’s ‘others’” (p. 81). This is an astonishing remark since the court proceedings were like a carnival in which the great majority of the white audience wanted Tom to be found guilty. Even his death did not lead to “introspection.” On page 265 of the novel, we read, “Maycomb was interested by the news of Tom’s death for perhaps two days…” I spare readers the following few lines of the quote. Suffice to say that the whole event reinforced the views that the white population held about Blacks rather than make them examine those views.

    The second text is by the Chinese academics Gao Fen and Zhang Shanming: “The Ethical Stance in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird.” Forum for World Literature Studies 16 (4):601-612, 2024. The authors do not doubt that the purpose of Harper Lee’s writing of this novel was “to expose and criticize racial discrimination in the southern society” (p. 605). However, her novel “reveals the limitations of her class perspective” (p. 603). This is shown in how she treats crucial issues race relations at that time. First, she “vulgarizes the underclass whites” (601, 603). The father and daughter who bring the rape accusations against Tom Robinson belong to that class. Harper Lee does not problematize the harsh economic realities that this class suffered through the Economic Depression. In Lee’s novel, the motivational context of Mayella Ewell’s accusation is a conflict with her violent father who lives on welfare assistance. The authors of this analysis seriously write, “Mayella Ewell serves as a representative of the underclass whites. She succumbs to her animal instincts by violating ethical taboos to seduce a black man” (p. 603). Second, Harper mutes “the collective voice of black individuals” (p. 602). This is said to become apparent when, before the court case starts in the courthouse, the white population of Maycomb turns the event into a carnival-like event, while “the Negroes sat quietly in the sun …” (p. 604, authors’ italics). This is taken as denying the Blacks the possibility of collective agency. “…black people were silent, and their suffering was reduced to evidence of the high morality of whites in mainstream society” (ibid.). Third, Harper Lee created a “moral myth.” Atticus Finch becomes “the spokesman of the white ideology of the upper-class in the American South…” (ibid.). The context of all this was a crisis of “Americanness” brought about to the double phenomena of the Civil Rights Movement and the Cold War. In this sense, “The publication of To Kill a Mockingbird did not happen in a vacuum” (p. 608). The authors repeatedly claim that the case of the “Scottsboro Boys” was an important event underlying Harper’s motivation in writing her novel. From this perspective, they conclude, “Harper Lee turns the real history into a story that foregrounds class ideology. She attributes the virtues of human goodness to the mainstream white characters, casting them as ‘saviors’ in resolving racial conflicts…” (p. 610f., author’ italics).

    Autumn A. Allen. 2020. “‘Whose Side Are You on?’ Moral Consequences of Young Readers’ Responses to To Kill a Mockingbird.” Research on Diversity in Youth Literature 2 (2), article 5. 20 pages. This article has two parts. The first is an experiment in inducing the responses of young readers when reading the book, about the plot, analyzing its characters, etc. The second makes general points about how the novel is constructed. It is the second point that should concern us here. Fundamentally, one needs to keep in mind that the narrator is a young white child who deeply cares about her father. When Scout worries about the situation, she worries about her father, not about Tom Robinson, whom she objectifies in her descriptions of his appearance when she sees him in court. “Most readers can infer Tom’s hopelessness, but it is merely a plot point; the focus of their empathy is the White savior, who tires himself defending the downtrodden” (p. 13). This also applies to Scout’s relationship with Calpurnia. She “is no more than a one-dimensional prop in Scout’s growth. Scout’s realization that Calpurnia has a community and a life outside of caring for Scout’s family does not come with an understanding that Calpurnia’s life and culture are equal to her own” (p. 14). From this perspective, Atticus’ Finch supposed heroism is rather problematic. He is seen as embodying “a different kind of racism” since he does not defend Tom Robinson based on an understanding of the equality of Whites and Blacks, but merely because he cannot stand that a low-class White takes “advantage of a Negro’s ignorance” (p. 16). “Tom is the test of Atticus’s commitment to justice, and Atticus’s commitment to justice is based on the kind of person he strives to be, not based on his belief in the equality of Black people” (ibid.). “Every time Atticus explains why he is defending Tom Robinson, he talks about himself, not about Tom. … The book is about how White people constructed their own identities relative to Blackness in the early twentieth century” (ibid.). Thus, one question would be why contemporary school children needed to learn through literature how White middle-class people in a small racially segregated town in Alabama constructed their identities vis-à-vis the Black population. In sum, should teachers still use Harper Lee’s book in the curriculum? Allen writes, “Ultimately, given the barriers the text poses to living through and developing empathy for Black characters (and, by extension, Black people), teachers could better harness the power of literature by assigning books that center the dilemmas, choices, feelings and concerns of Black people, either in place of or alongside books such as To Kill a Mockingbird” (p. 19). From this perspective, on the one hand, Harper Lee’s novel has constructive defects that are so serious as to make the use of this novel in teaching middle-school students inadvisable, not the least because teachers would be hard-pressed to provide sufficient historical and literary context. On the other hand, it is precisely the weaknesses of the novel that should encourage analytical teaching in classroom settings. In fact, schoolchildren can learn from good examples just as well as from problematic examples, perhaps even more from the latter. In any case, the weaknesses of To Kill a Mockingbird cannot mean that the novel should be purged from school libraries.

    Isaac Saney. 2003. “The case against To Kill a Mockingbird.” Race and Class 45 (1):99-110. He provides a Canadian perspective. He takes on one of the central sentences in the novel, namely, “Mockingbirds don’t do one thing but make music for us to enjoy. They don’t eat up people’s gardens, don’t nest in corncribs, they don’t do one thing but sing their hearts out for us. That’s why it’s a sin to kill a mockingbird” (quoted on p. 101f.). The author continuous, “Is not the mockingbird a metaphor for the entire African American population? … Harper Lee’s motives notwithstanding, they are not a paean to the intrinsic equality and humanity of all peoples, nor do they acknowledge that Blacks are endowed with the same worth and rights as whites” (p. 102). Like Allen, Saney takes issue with the passive character of the Blacks in the novel: “Perhaps the most egregious characteristic of the novel is the denial of the historical agency of Black people. They are robbed of their role as subjects of history, reduced to mere objects who are passive hapless victims; mere spectators and bystanders in the struggle against their own oppression and exploitation. There’s the rub!” (ibid.). The novel, the author says, simply ignores the movements of black people that was going on at the time the novel is set. “To Kill a Mockingbird gives no inkling of this mass protest and instead creates the indelible impression that the entire Black community existed in a complete state of paralysis” (p. 103). Instead, other literary sources should be used in teaching schoolchildren, such as Invisible Man (Ralph Ellison), Native Son (Richard Wright), Their Eyes Were Watching God (Zora Neal Hursten), The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Beloved and The Bluest Eye (Toni Morrison), Whylah Falls (George Elliot Clarke), and Consecrated Ground (George Boyd).

    MHN

    Nonthaburi, Thailand

    3 July 2025

    Earlier brief descriptions of books in this series:

    Anne Berest. 2023. The Postcard. A Novel. New York Europa Editions.   475 pp.  The original French publication appeared in 2021, entitled La card postale, at the Editions Grasset & Fasquelle. It was translated by Tina Kover.

    Michael Frank. 2023. One Hundred Saturdays: Stella Levi and the Search for a Lost World. Artwork by Maira Kalman. London: Souvenir Press.  215 pp.

    Filip Müller. 1979. Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers. Literary collaboration by Helmut Freitag. Edited and translated by Susanne Flatauer. New York: Stein and Day. New German edition 2022, Sonderbehandlung: Meine Jahre in den Krematorien und Gaskammern von Auschwitz. Deutsche Bearbeitung von Helmut Freitag. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.  320 pp.

    Angus Deaton. 2023. Economics in America: An Immigrant Economist Explores the Land of Inequality. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.   271 pp.

    Charlotte Wood. 2019. The Weekend. A Novel. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. 262 pp.

    Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes. 2019. The Light that Failed: Why the West is Losing the Fight for Democracy. New York: Pegasus Books.   247 pp.

    Laurent Mauvignier. 2023. The Birthday Party. London: Fitzcarraldo Editions.   499 pp.  French original Histoires de la nuit, Les Editions de Minuit, 2020. Translated by Daniel Levin Becker.

    Margaret O’Mara. 2019. The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America. New York: Penguin Press.   496 pp.

    Christopher R. Browning. 2005. The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939—March 1942. With contributions by Jürgen Matthäus. Published by the University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, and Yad Vashem, Jerusalem. London: Arrow Books.

    615 pp.

    Celeste Ng. 2022. Our Missing Hearts. London: Abacus Books.  335 pp.

    Ingeborg Rapoport. 2021. Meine ersten drei Leben: Erinnerungen. [My First Three Lives: Memoirs.] Berlin: Bild und Heimat.  415 pp. First pocketbook edition 2002. Original edition 1997.

    Jan-Werner Müller. 2022. Democracy Rules. Penguin Books. xvi+236 pp.

    Seichō Matsumoto. 2022 [Third edition 2023]. Tokyo Express [Ten to Sen, Points and Lines]. Translated by Jesse Kirkwood. Dublin: Penguin Books.   149 pp.

    Itamar Vieira Junior. 2023. Crooked Plow. Translated by Johnny Lorenz. London and New York: Verso.   276 pp. Originally published in Brazilian Portuguese in 2018, entitled Torto Arado.

    Heather Cox Richardson. 2023. Democracy Awakening: Notes on the State of America. London: WH Allen.  xvii+286 pp.

    Celeste Ng. 2017. Little Fires Everywhere. A Novel. New York: Penguin Press.  338 pp.

    Paul Lynch. 2023. Prophet Song. London: Oneworld Publications.   309 pp.

    Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. 2023. Tyranny of the Minority: How to Reverse an Authoritarian Turn and Forge a Democracy for All. Dublin: Viking.   388 pp.

    Luke Jennings. 2018. Killing Eve: Codename Villanelle. London: John Murray.   217 pp. (Originally published in serial form in 2014.) Volume 2: No Tomorrow. London: John Murray. 2018.   248 pp. Volume 3: Die For Me [UK: Endgame]. London: John Murray. 2020.   228 pp.

    Adelle Waldman. 2024. Help Wanted. A Novel. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.  276 pp.

    Selva Almada. 2024. Not a River. Translated by Annie McDermott. Edinburgh: Charco Press. 93 pp. / Ia Genberg. 2024. The Details. Translated by Kira Josefsson. London: Wildfire. 151 pp. /

    Jente Posthuma. 2023. What I’d Rather Not Think About. Melbourne, London, Minneapolis: Scribe.  203 pp.

    Jenny Erpenbeck. 2024. Kairos. Translated by Michael Hofmann. New York and London: New Directions (W.W. Norton).   304 pp.  German original: Kairos. Roman. München: Penguin Verlag. Original edition 2021, softcover 2023. 379 pp.

    Paul Murray. 2024. The Bee Sting. London: Penguin Books. 645 pages. First published in 2023 by Hamish Hamilton. Shortlisted for the Booker Prize 2023.   643 pp.

    Charlotte Wood. 2023. Stone Yard Devotional. London: Sceptre.  297 pp.

    Samantha Harvey. 2024. Orbital. Dublin: Vintage.   136 pp.

    Yael Van Der Wouden. 2024. The Safekeep. A Novel. Dublin: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Books. 262 pages.

    Rachel Kushner. 2024. Creation Lake. London: Jonathan Cape.   407 pp.

    Anne Serre. 2023. A Leopard-Skin Hat. Translated from French by Mark Hutchinson. London: Lolli Editions. Originally published by Éditions Mercure de France in 2008 as Un chapeau léopard. This English translation first published as New Directions Paperbook 1574 in 2023.   136 pp.

    Vincenzo Latronico. 2025. Perfection. Translated by Sophie Hughes. London: Fitzcarraldo Editions.  113 pp.

    Dahlia de la Cerda. 2024. Reservoir Bitches. Translated by Heather Cleary and Julia Sanches. Melbourne, London, Minneapolis: Scribe.   184 pages

    Miranda July. 2024. All Fours. New York: Riverhead Books.  326 pp.

    Liz Moore. 2024. The God of the Woods. London: The Borough Press. 435 pages

    Slavoj Žižek. 2023. Freedom: A Disease Without Cure. London et al: Bloomsbury Academic. 320 pages

    Onyi Nwabineli. 2024. Allow Me to Introduce Myself: Her Life. Her Rules. Finally. London: Magpie Books.  313 pages

    Claire Messud. 2024. This Strange Eventful History. London: Fleet.  428 pp.

  • Anne Berest. 2023. The Postcard. A Novel. New York Europa Editions.  The original French publication appeared in 2021, entitled La card postale, at the Editions Grasset & Fasquelle. It was translated by Tina Kover.

    Claire Messud. 2024. This Strange Eventful History. London: Fleet.

    Yael Van Der Wouden. 2024. The Safekeep. A Novel. Dublin: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Books.

    Itamar Vieira Junior. 2023. Crooked Plow. Translated by Johnny Lorenz. London and New York: Verso.   Originally published in Brazilian Portuguese in 2018, entitled Torto Arado.

    Laurent Mauvignier. 2023. The Birthday Party. London: Fitzcarraldo Editions. French original Histoires de la nuit, Les Editions de Minuit, 2020. Translated by Daniel Levin Becker.

  • This novel tells part of the story of Claire Messud’s family in fictionalized form. It is a massive text filled with dense atmospheric prose (sometimes, I could not help thinking that fewer words would have been better) and occasional dialogues. Her writing style captured my attention, and I very much looked forward to my daily dose of pre-bedtime reading. Yet, this is not an easy text because readers witness an utter alienation of two people who had once loved each other so much that they would take the risk of marrying each other, though they were from very different backgrounds, indeed. These two people are the fictionalized parents of the author, called François and Barbara in the novel. They have two daughters, Chloe (Claire) and Loulou.

    François and his younger sister Denise were born to French-Algerian parents, Gaston and Lucienne (who was the youngest sister of Gaston’s mother). Their marriage was extremely happy, and they shared the “certainty that this love [was] their life’s masterpiece” (p. 421). To Françoise, his parent’s relationship seemed to have been the model that he hoped to replicate in his own marriage. The family considered Algier their home. But Algeria was part of France’s colonial possessions. So, this home could not last. The French and their indigenous helpers had to leave the country when it gained independence in 1962. Both groups had to relocate to France, were neither group was welcome.

    François received a Fulbright scholarship to study at Amherst. He later almost completed his Ph.D. at Harvard University with a thesis on politics in Turkey. “Almost,” because he thought that had to choose between realizing his dreams and becoming the provider for Barbara and his family. He met Barbara—a Canadian from Toronto who could never imagine a life outside of this city, least of all in the United States where they finally ended up—at a summer school at Oxford. Years later, in 1998 at age 65, Barbara reminisced:

    She’d been a constant disappointment, then, simply for being herself. But he still loved her, or claimed to, whereas she—well. She’d say that she did still love him, whatever that meant—just about. She cared for him, and worried about him, and felt pity for his suffering, and wished she could take away his pain. But she believed, wholeheartedly, that this had all been a mistake, that if she could call back in time to the girl she had been, dazzled by the dashing Frenchman on the bus in the rain at summer school at Oxford, she would say: “Don’t! Don’t do it. Walk away. Go home. … take the job at the Globe and Mail, and cling to it with all you’ve got. But whatever you do, don’t marry him. … No point imagining a life that wasn’t. There was plenty of good in this one, even with the glass half empty. And the kids—she couldn’t imagine her life without the kids. (p. 340, original italics)

    François, on the other hand, had hard feelings too. Almost ten years earlier, he thought to himself:

    All he’d ever wanted was to love and to be loved, to have the mirror perfection of his parents’ marriage. Even after all the years, so many arguments and harsh words, so many recriminations, so much disappointment, he kept trying: Barb was the love of his life, he’d never doubted it; he couldn’t believe, not really, that she thought their life together had been a terrible mistake. (p. 292)

    In 1998, he accepted that his original family was sort of a home to him. However:

    How to convey that even if he could belong to them, he needed not to; or, rather, he needed to find somewhere else or someone else to belong to; and that there, of course, lay the greatest sorrow, that Barbara did not, could not open her arms to him. She could not give him home. (p. 353)

    Yet, the time when either of them could or would seriously consider divorce was long gone. What sense did it make to divorce at age 65 and 67? Thus, they stayed together, living out their retirement in Connecticut until he died of cancer in 2010. By that time, Barbara barely recognized him any longer because she had developed serious dementia that had started several years earlier.  

    MHN

    Nonthaburi, Thailand

    12 June 2025

    Earlier brief descriptions of books in this series:

    Anne Berest. 2023. The Postcard. A Novel. New York Europa Editions.   475 pp.  The original French publication appeared in 2021, entitled La card postale, at the Editions Grasset & Fasquelle. It was translated by Tina Kover.

    Michael Frank. 2023. One Hundred Saturdays: Stella Levi and the Search for a Lost World. Artwork by Maira Kalman. London: Souvenir Press.  215 pp.

    Filip Müller. 1979. Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers. Literary collaboration by Helmut Freitag. Edited and translated by Susanne Flatauer. New York: Stein and Day. New German edition 2022, Sonderbehandlung: Meine Jahre in den Krematorien und Gaskammern von Auschwitz. Deutsche Bearbeitung von Helmut Freitag. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.  320 pp.

    Angus Deaton. 2023. Economics in America: An Immigrant Economist Explores the Land of Inequality. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.   271 pp.

    Charlotte Wood. 2019. The Weekend. A Novel. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. 262 pp.

    Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes. 2019. The Light that Failed: Why the West is Losing the Fight for Democracy. New York: Pegasus Books.   247 pp.

    Laurent Mauvignier. 2023. The Birthday Party. London: Fitzcarraldo Editions.   499 pp.  French original Histoires de la nuit, Les Editions de Minuit, 2020. Translated by Daniel Levin Becker.

    Margaret O’Mara. 2019. The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America. New York: Penguin Press.   496 pp.

    Christopher R. Browning. 2005. The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939—March 1942. With contributions by Jürgen Matthäus. Published by the University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, and Yad Vashem, Jerusalem. London: Arrow Books.

    615 pp.

    Celeste Ng. 2022. Our Missing Hearts. London: Abacus Books.  335 pp.

    Ingeborg Rapoport. 2021. Meine ersten drei Leben: Erinnerungen. [My First Three Lives: Memoirs.] Berlin: Bild und Heimat.  415 pp. First pocketbook edition 2002. Original edition 1997.

    Jan-Werner Müller. 2022. Democracy Rules. Penguin Books. xvi+236 pp.

    Seichō Matsumoto. 2022 [Third edition 2023]. Tokyo Express [Ten to Sen, Points and Lines]. Translated by Jesse Kirkwood. Dublin: Penguin Books.   149 pp.

    Itamar Vieira Junior. 2023. Crooked Plow. Translated by Johnny Lorenz. London and New York: Verso.   276 pp. Originally published in Brazilian Portuguese in 2018, entitled Torto Arado.

    Heather Cox Richardson. 2023. Democracy Awakening: Notes on the State of America. London: WH Allen.  xvii+286 pp.

    Celeste Ng. 2017. Little Fires Everywhere. A Novel. New York: Penguin Press.  338 pp.

    Paul Lynch. 2023. Prophet Song. London: Oneworld Publications.   309 pp.

    Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. 2023. Tyranny of the Minority: How to Reverse an Authoritarian Turn and Forge a Democracy for All. Dublin: Viking.   388 pp.

    Luke Jennings. 2018. Killing Eve: Codename Villanelle. London: John Murray.   217 pp. (Originally published in serial form in 2014.) Volume 2: No Tomorrow. London: John Murray. 2018.   248 pp. Volume 3: Die For Me [UK: Endgame]. London: John Murray. 2020.   228 pp.

    Adelle Waldman. 2024. Help Wanted. A Novel. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.  276 pp.

    Selva Almada. 2024. Not a River. Translated by Annie McDermott. Edinburgh: Charco Press. 93 pp. / Ia Genberg. 2024. The Details. Translated by Kira Josefsson. London: Wildfire. 151 pp. /

    Jente Posthuma. 2023. What I’d Rather Not Think About. Melbourne, London, Minneapolis: Scribe.  203 pp.

    Jenny Erpenbeck. 2024. Kairos. Translated by Michael Hofmann. New York and London: New Directions (W.W. Norton).   304 pp.  German original: Kairos. Roman. München: Penguin Verlag. Original edition 2021, softcover 2023. 379 pp.

    Paul Murray. 2024. The Bee Sting. London: Penguin Books. 645 pages. First published in 2023 by Hamish Hamilton. Shortlisted for the Booker Prize 2023.   643 pp.

    Charlotte Wood. 2023. Stone Yard Devotional. London: Sceptre.  297 pp.

    Samantha Harvey. 2024. Orbital. Dublin: Vintage.   136 pp.

    Yael Van Der Wouden. 2024. The Safekeep. A Novel. Dublin: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Books. 262 pages.

    Rachel Kushner. 2024. Creation Lake. London: Jonathan Cape.   407 pp.

    Anne Serre. 2023. A Leopard-Skin Hat. Translated from French by Mark Hutchinson. London: Lolli Editions. Originally published by Éditions Mercure de France in 2008 as Un chapeau léopard. This English translation first published as New Directions Paperbook 1574 in 2023.   136 pp.

    Vincenzo Latronico. 2025. Perfection. Translated by Sophie Hughes. London: Fitzcarraldo Editions.  113 pp.

    Dahlia de la Cerda. 2024. Reservoir Bitches. Translated by Heather Cleary and Julia Sanches. Melbourne, London, Minneapolis: Scribe.   184 pages

    Miranda July. 2024. All Fours. New York: Riverhead Books.  326 pp.

    Liz Moore. 2024. The God of the Woods. London: The Borough Press. 435 pages

    Slavoj Žižek. 2023. Freedom: A Disease Without Cure. London et al: Bloomsbury Academic. 320 pages

    Onyi Nwabineli. 2024. Allow Me to Introduce Myself: Her Life. Her Rules. Finally. London: Magpie Books.  313 pages

  • Theme: Consciousness and communication as separate autopoietic systems

    linked via structural coupling

    Normally, my book summaries are about recently published novels and general-interest non-fiction books. This one is an exception (it remains to be a summary; it is not an essay). It was prompted when I began reading Anil Seth. 2021. Being You: A New Science of Consciousness. In an earlier introduction to his approach (“The Real Problem,” 2016), Seth included statements such as that brains made sense out of the data sent to it by the human body’s senses based on “prior expectations or ‘beliefs’ about the way the world is.” Moreover, the brain used these beliefs to form the brain’s optimal hypothesis of the causes of these sensory signals … What we see is the brain’s ‘best guess’ of what’s out there (p. 6). Thus, “perceptual content is carried by perceptual predictions” (p. 7). I was fundamentally irritated, either by what Seth thought, or how he chose the wording, because those words seemed to turn the brain into a meaning-based actor.[1] I got the impression that he humanized what I would rather see as a self-organizing adaptive apparatus (adaptive regarding both information from its own body as well as data from its environment that it received through the body’s senses) that serves to maintain its own internal functional homeostasis as well as that of the body. This view is another way of saying what Niklas Luhmann stated in the above book on p. 35:

    Organisms can, insofar as their viability in an environment is secured, organize a self-observation with the help of the nervous system. The observation refers exclusively to the internal state of the organism. This applies also to brains of every kind. Consciousness develops— parasitically, in whatever way—on this reality basis, but with the opposite tendency: primarily to observe that which it can see as an external world. Consciousness is, to a considerable extent of its attention, perceiving consciousness, and would, without possibilities of perception, quickly wither.[2]

    To give an initial orientation about the relationship between consciousness and communication, here is a quote from Luhmann’s definitive statement in his two-volume Die Gesellchaft der Gesellchaft (Theory of Society) that was published roughly one year before his death in November 1998. The statement is taken from the chapter on “structural coupling.” This concept “consciously aims at the question of how autopoietic systems, notwithstanding their own autonomy and operative closure, can still be thought of as being connected to the environment.”[3] Luhmann writes:

    … all communication is structurally coupled with consciousness. Without consciousness, communication is impossible. Communication is totally dependent (in every operation) on consciousness—if only because only consciousness and not communication itself can perceive sensorily, and neither oral nor written communication could function without perception. … Nonetheless, consciousness is neither the “subject” of communication nor in any other sense a “vehicle” of communication. It contributes no operations of any sort to communication (e.g., in the sense of a successive thought-speech-thought-speech sequence). Communication functions only because no recursions have to be produced between such heterogeneous modes of operation and because communication has no need to thematize the presupposition of consciousness, but accepts it through structural couplings. We must therefore abandon the classical metaphor that communication is a “transmission” of semantic content by one psychic system that possesses it to another.[4]

    From here, my summary will proceed sequentially in four steps. Each step presents statements from relevant publications by Luhmann. These steps are as follows.

    1) Social Systems

    2) “What is Communication?”

    3) “How Can the Mind Participate in Communication?”

    4) Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Science as a Social System)

    1) Social Systems

    Since this summary is not about the entire book Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Science as a Social System) but only on the first chapter, entitled “Consciousness and Communication” (pages 11-67), I shall start with explaining how Luhmann constructs the concept of “communication.” Obviously, the everyday understanding that a sender sends (transfers) a message (or meaningful content) to a recipient, or that a communicative interaction takes place is not what Luhmann has in mind. Instead, he conceptualizes communication as a process that comprises three selections, namely information, utterance, and understanding. He says, “From now on we will treat communication as a three-part unity. We will begin from the fact that three selections must be synthesized in order for communication to appear as an emergent occurrence.”[5] The first selection concerns information. A piece of information does not normally impose itself on me. Rather, at any given time, I am surrounded by a great many of them. Thus, in order to begin a communication, I will have to select one piece of information. In a second step, I will have to select an utterance. After all, a piece of information does not normally determine by itself how I utter it. There will be different ways of doing so. After I have made my utterance, the receiving psychic system does not take it as I have spoken it. Rather, first, it must understand that this was not merely simple behavior (such as when the personnel at a hotel, upon checking in, hands the keycard of my room to me). It must understand that I had to select the information as well as the utterance. And it can pay its attention both to the intentions that led me to select the information and the utterance as well as to the content of the utterance. “Communication emerges only if this last difference [between information and utterance] is observed, expected, understood, and used as the basis for connecting with further behaviors” (p. 141).[6] This third selective component of a communication is conceptually very important: “The fact that understanding is an indispensable feature in how communication comes about has far-reaching significance for comprehending communication. One consequence is that communication is possible only as a self-referential process” (ibid., p. 143, original italics.). Any connecting communication includes a test of whether the preceding communication was understood. Furthermore: “From the assumption that communication is a basally self-referential process that coordinates three different selections in each of its elements, it follows that, according to systems theory, that there can be no environmental correlate for communication. The unity of communication corresponds to nothing in the environment” (p. 144). Such formulations always refer to the principle that systems are operationally closed[7] but cognitively open. This means that the environment (neither the physical environment nor the physical brains of the participating psychic systems) cannot contribute any operations to the communicative process. It can only contribute data to communication in so far as the communication system perceives them. “‘Cognitively open’, therefore, does not mean anything else than that the system creates the respective information in a condition of external reference, relating them to differences in its environment.”[8]

    This conception of communication does not make “action” entirely disappear. One can still ask: “For social systems, which is truly the final element with which relations are created and which cannot be further decomposed—action or communication?” (p. 164). In short, it is communication. However, to operate as a communication system, its symmetry must be interrupted. Being symmetrical means that all of the selections can serve as points of continuation of the system. Yet, a selection cannot do anything by itself, and the word indicates that there must be an entity that makes the selections. Since this is the consciousness of a psychic system, the concept of “action” offers itself. Thus, “Only by building the understanding of action into a communicative occurrence can communication become asymmetrical; only thus can a person who utters information give directives to its receiver, and this can be reversed only if the receiver begins to utter something of his own, that is, begins to act” (p. 165, original italics). In this way, the symmetrical unity of the communication is made to appear as if it was an interaction between two (or more) actors. In Luhmann’s words:

    Thus, a social system is constituted as an action system on the basis of communicative happenings, and using their operative means. The system generates a description of itself in itself to steer the continuation of the process, the reproduction of the system. Communication’s symmetry is made asymmetrical to allow self-observation and self-description … And in this abbreviated, simplified, and thereby more easily comprehensible self-description, action—not communication—serves as the final element. (p. 165).

    To add to the preceding quote: At the beginning of the chapter 4 in Social Systems that deal with “Communication and Action,” Luhmann turned against Max Weber and Talcott Parsons who had both, in different ways, seen social action as a special case of action. He states,

    If one begins with the possibility of a theory of self-referential systems and with problems of complexity, there is much to suggest simply reversing the relationship of constraint. Sociality is not a special case of action; instead, action is constituted in social systems by means of communication and attribution as a reduction of complexity, as an indispensable self-simplification of the system. (p. 137, my italics)

    However, this should not be misunderstood as encouraging methodological (or even methodical) individualism. When a researcher wants to investigate social phenomena, such as an anti-government protest, a military coup, the drafting of a new constitution, or the royal capture of the command over regular army combat units, it would be wrong to start by investigating the mental states of the participants. It is almost common sense when Luhmann points out that, Observers can predict action better by knowing a situation than by knowing people, and, correspondingly, their observation of actions often, if not always, is not concerned with the mental state of the actor, but with carrying out the autopoietic reproduction of the social system” (p. 166).[9] And an anti-government protest and the other examples mentioned above are social systems, or they occur as events within encompassing social systems. “Nevertheless, everyday action is attributed to individuals” (ibid.). Luhmann follows up on this quote with an ironical remark, saying, “Such extremely unrealistic behavior can only be explained by a need to reduce complexity” (ibid.).[10]

    2) “What is Communication?”

    This step is still concerned with clarifying Luhmann’s concept of communication. In a lecture-based article called “What is Communication?”, he summarized his approach in 21 points.[11] It is probably not necessary to list all these points here because they overlap of what was said above already. Nevertheless, I selected some of them to further clarify the concept. The issue headlines are italics in the original.

    Only communication can communicate.”

    Luhmann rejects the common view that “In the end, it is always people, individuals, subjects who act or communicate” (p. 156). Contrary to that perspective, “I would like to assert  … that only communication can communicate and what we understand as ‘action’ can be generated only in such a network of communication” (ibid., my italics).

    Self-reference is not a special property of thought.”

    Sociological theory must begin with communication. “For not action, but communication is an unavoidably social operation and at the same time an operation that is necessarily set in motion whenever social situations are formed” (my italics). Consequently, Luhmann states that in conceptualizing communication, he will “strictly avoid any reference to consciousness or to life, that is, to other levels of the realization of autopoietic systems.” It should be noted at this point that he refers to both the brain and to consciousness as autopoietic systems. As a “precaution,” he adds that, obviously, communication is impossible without neither. Yet, it is also impossible “without carbon, without moderate temperatures, without the earth’s magnetic field, without the atomic bonding of matter. Faced with the complexity of the world, one cannot take all the conditions of the possibility of a state of affairs into the concept of this state of affairs, for the concept would thereby lose all of its contours and any technical applicability to theory construction” (p. 157).

    Communication comes about through a synthesis of three different selections.

    “Like life and consciousness, communication is also an emergent reality, a self-generated state of affairs” (ibid, my italics). I have said enough about this above.

    It is of paramount significance to maintain the distinction between perception and communication.”

    Perception “remains locked up within consciousness and [is] nontransparent to the system of communication as well as to every other consciousness” (ibid., my italics). However, a participant can insert his/her perceptions into communications.

    Even understanding is itself a selection.”

    “Understanding is never a mere duplication of the utterance in another consciousness…” (ibid.) “Whatever the participants in their own respective self-referential, closed consciousnesses may think, the communication system works out its own understanding and creates processes of self-observation and self-inspection for this purpose” (ibid., my italics).

    What is new about this concept of communication?

    “…a systems’-theoretical approach emphasizes the emergence of communication itself. Nothing is transferred” (p. 160, original italics).

    With these three components, it is a matter of different selections.”

    “There is no information outside of communication; there is no utterance outside of communication; there is no understanding outside of communication” (ibid.).

    A system of communication is a completely closed system.”

    “A system of communication is therefore a fully closed system that generates the components of which it consists through communication itself” (ibid.). “Only communication can influence communication; only communication can decompose units of communication (for example, by analyzing the hirozon od horizon of selection of a piece of information or asking about the reasons for an utterance); and only communication can inspect and repair communication.” (p. 161). I don’t know how many times I have sat at home and thought about communications I had. Those thoughts occurred in my consciousness. They would have no effect on the communication that has passed already. In trying to change any deficiencies, I would have to enter into a new set of communications with the same participants.

    Communication has no goal.”

    “It [communication] happens, or not, and that is all that one can say on that point.” (p. 161)

    All communication is risky.”

    After all, an utterance can be rejected. This has important implication, because “It leads to the building of institutions that secure a disposition of acceptance even towards improbable communications” (p. 162). However, it can also lead to the avoidance of utterances if participants have a sense that they might be rejected.

    Communication duplicates reality.”

    “Therefore, to repeat this important point once more in other words, communication duplicates reality. It creates two versions, a yes-version and a no-version, and thereby compels selection” (p. 163). If a participant sees the risk as too high, he/she might simply end the communication.

    One’s own consciousness dances about upon the words like a will-o’-the-wisp [Irrlicht].”

    “This superiority of consciousness to communication (which, of course, corresponds in inverted system-reference to a superiority of communication over consciousness) becomes fully clear if one realizes that consciousness is occupied not only with words or with vague word-and-sentence ideas, but additionally and often more importantly with perception and with the imaginative construction and dismantling of images. Even during speech, consciousness is ceaselessly occupied with perception…” (p. 166).

    It is inevitable to adapt communication to the will-o’-the-wisp of consciousness.”

    Communication cannot deal with the bits and pieces of consciousness. An utterance cannot be composed of merely bits and pieces of a participant’s thought process. “The autopoietic autonomy of consciousness, one could say, is represented and compensated in communication by binarization” (p. 167), that is, utterances that can be accepted or rejected, irrespective of the turmoil that might at the same time take place in the participant’s consciousness.

    Communication can be interfered with by consciousness.”

    “… communication can be interfered with by consciousness and even anticipates this, but only in forms that are connectable in further communication and that can thus be treated communicatively. In this way, a mixing of the autopoiesis of the two systems never comes about, yet a high degree of co-evolution and practiced reactivity does” (p. 167).

    3) “How Can the Mind Participate in Communication?”

    Having come to this point, I have covered most of the path leading to the book this summary is about. Yet, there is still one article I would like to mention because it happens to be very topical: “How Can the Mind Participate in Communication?” The German original text does not say “mind” but “consciousness.”[12]

    It might be best to start with a formulation that is typical Luhmann: “Humans cannot communicate; not even their brains can communicate; not even their conscious minds [German: “Bewusstsein” or consciousness] can communicate. Only communications can communicate” (p. 169, my italics). And no consciousness can link up with another consciousness [the English translation on p. 170 uses “minds”]. It can merely imagine performing a communication. However, this imagination remains internal to consciousness. “No mind can operatively think outside itself, although it can certainly think of something else within itself” (p. 182). Moreover, consciousness is “fluid, constantly changing” (p. 171). Above, I quoted the will-o’-the-wisp of consciousness. How can communication rely on such a fickle foundation? “How can communication reproduce itself if it must rely on a multitude of nervously vibrating brains and agitated minds?” (ibid.). For better or worse, communication depends on consciousness. Communication can only be produced when at least two conscious minds can produce the three selections of information, utterance, and understanding. Yet, “psychic systems and social systems never fuse or even partially overlap but are completely separate, self-referentially closed, autopoietic-reproductive systems. As I said: humans cannot communicate” (p. 176).

    However, the mind, by producing thoughts, can “disturb, stimulate, and irritate communication” (ibid.). This is not to be understood as if consciousness was able to instruct communications regarding its content and procedure, because this is done in the system of communication itself. What gives consciousness a certain advantage is the fact that it is only consciousness that is capable of perception. And this perception remains “locked up” (p. 177) in consciousness. Given this situation, all that a psychic system participating in communication can do is to treat perception as information and formulate it as an utterance that another psychic system can understand. Yet, this understanding can only use the utterance, not the original perception (except the fact that a perception did occur) made by the other participating psychic system. Communication “cannot copy states of mind, cannot imitate them, cannot represent them” (p. 178). Likewise, environmental factors can enter communication only through this occurrence of perception, never directly. Here, Luhmann introduces the phrase “structural complementarity.” On the one hand, communication can only occur by virtue of active consciousness. On the other hand, consciousness is attracted by interesting content.

    Thus, we can keep in mind that:

    • One communication is the unity of three selections: information, utterance, and understanding.
    • At least two psychic systems (even if one is dead already, like Luhmann, and even if the utterance is a rather long one at 732 pp) are involved in creating one communication.
    • Both consciousness and communication are self-referentially closed systems, though they are open to perception and cognition.
    • Communication is structurally coupled with consciousness, which means that all communications, though depending on processes of thought, remain self-referential, depending on their own structures. The same applies to the relationship between the brain and consciousness. Both are self-referentially closed systems, but consciousness is structurally coupled with the brain. In other words, consciousness depends on the existence and proper functioning of the brain, but its operations are not determined by the brain. Simply put: The brain enables consciousness, but it does not determine the content of thoughts.  

    4) Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Science as a Social System)

    Finally, I will move to Luhmann’s book Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Science of Society, Science as a Social System). Since much has been said already about how Luhmann conceptualizes consciousness and communications, and how he links them, there is not that much I would like to add. Still, it needs to be recalled that autopoietic systems, such as the brain, consciousness, and communications, gain their respective unity as systems by producing the elements of which they are composed by their own internal structures. The complementary concept of structural coupling means that the brain needs a body, consciousness needs the brain, and communication needs consciousness to exist, though none of the systems can contribute operations to the other systems. There is also no “overlapping” of the systems. What, for example, consciousness can do to communication or the latter to the former is producing “irritations.”

    The mutual dependence is reduced to the form of mutual irritations that are noticed and processed only in the irritated system. (p. 36)

    Irritations are entirely internal states of systems. Luhmann clarifies this in a comprehensive text passage:

    Irritation, like surprise, disturbance, disappointment, etc., is always a state internal to the system, for which there is no equivalent in the environment. In other words, the environment itself does not have to be irritated in order to serve as a source of irritation for the system. Irritations arise only under the condition of structuring expectations, and they are irritations only insofar as they pose a problem for the continuation of the system’s autopoiesis. (p. 40)

    A conscious mind can produce an utterance that irritates communication, but the latter can also irritate the conscious mind. Communication gives the conscious mind something to think about, while the utterance produced by a conscious mind gives the communication something to communicate about. The respective thoughts and communications are recursive. Recursive relations simply are those “in which the conclusion of an operation is the condition for another to take place.”[13] Thoughts must recursively follow preceding thoughts (one cannot not think, one can only think not to think, or one dies), and communications recursively follow preceding communications (if the latter indeed continue; they might also end, for example when a meeting is over and the participants return to their offices). For an observer, such as a participant in communications, it may seem as if thoughts and utterances constituted unity. This, however, is not the case.

    Even the structural operational interconnection of consciousness and communication is only a moment-to-moment variable coupling, which continually renews the systems’ freedom for autonomous movement with the completion of each individual event.[14]

    In other words, for making an utterance, consciousness must momentarily concentrate on what is to be uttered; making utterances requires attention at the moment they are made. But as soon that they are made, consciousness is free to follow its own flow of thoughts again. At this point, another concept enters the picture: persons/people. They are neither psychic systems nor human beings in their totality. Rather, they are attributions, or constructs, that communication systems devise to have addressees for utterances and understanding. After all, communications cannot directly access a conscious mind.

                Fundamental for the assumption of a strict separation of consciousness and communication is the radical temporalization of the participating systems via their individual operations. “Operations are events that disappear in the very moment of their occurrence and cannot be repeated.” This sentence reflects a key element of Luhmann’s approach, and it cannot be repeated too often. Social systems in Luhmann’s sense are not merely analytical tools, and they are neither objects nor collections of institutions. Social systems exist only because they are able recursively to produce another momentary operation as soon as the preceding operation has vanished (see footnote 7). As for the strict separation of consciousness and communication, if four people are in a meeting and they communicate. In such a case, Luhmann states, their talk appears as events in four conscious systems. But these events are not identical. Put another way, communications are not simply copies that are implanted into the participating conscious systems, thereby producing identical compact pieces of meaning in all four conscious systems. Rather, the communications are perceived and processed in participating conscious systems with reference to their different internal networks of other events. We must keep in mind that the conscious minds that participate in such a meeting are internally in a constant flux of creating momentary events followed recursively by other events, followed recursively by other events, and so forth. It is on this basis that the three selections that constitute one communication—information, utterance, understanding—are made. Both the conscious system that produces the utterance and the conscious system producing the understanding operate in a constant flux of only momentarily meaningful events. (When I was still working at university, this was what made me hate having to be an active participant in department meetings.) To use another word, each conscious system has a different memory and must therefore connect what is being said in the meeting to different preceding internal operations.  In a different context, Luhmann noted that society “tolerates the uncoordinated multiplicity of perspectives of the endogenously restless individual systems.”[15] (In those department meetings, I was regularly baffled by how one communication could lead to entirely unanticipated reactions by participants and thus might have become less than tolerant.)[16] Luhmann follows this section with the statement:

    Only when this state of affairs has been sufficiently grasped and described can one recognize how consciousness and communication do, after all, form a necessary connection (but not, that is, a unified system). The key to this lies in the concept of structural coupling. (p. 38; original italics).

    In The Theory of Society (Vol. 1, p. 54), Luhmann put this point more dramatically. He stated that the question was how the system of society

    organizes its relationship with the environment if it maintains no contact with this environment and has only its own referential capacity at its disposition. The entire theory of society depends on the answer to this question… The answer to a difficult question is a difficult concept. Following Humberto Maturana, we speak of “structural coupling.”

    The introduction of this concept, to put this another way, “consciously aims at the question of how autopoietic systems, notwithstanding their own autonomy and operative closure, can still be thought of as being connected to the environment.”[17] This connection must exclude the possibility that a system’s own structures are determined by its environment. On the other hand, certain environmental conditions must exist independently of a system—without affecting the content of a system’s operations—because otherwise the system would cease to exist. In the case of social systems, all communications are structurally coupled to consciousness.

    Without consciousness, communication is impossible. Communication is totally dependent (in every operation) on consciousness—if only because only consciousness and not communication itself can perceive sensorily, and neither oral nor written communication could function without perception.[18]

    Again, this is not to be understood as a causal relationship in the sense that consciousness causes a certain content of communication, though it is most directly involved in the perception and selection of information and the selection of an utterance (but it cannot take part in the concluding selection, that is, the understanding by another conscious system). Rather, it is about the simultaneity of a connection in which communication relies on the materiality of consciousness to produce and continue its operations. This kind of structural coupling is enabled by language. In turn, consciousness is structurally coupled with its physical foundation:

    Consciousness processes the thoughts currently available to it in a specific sequence, while numerous bodily processes, especially those of the brain, take place simultaneously, enabling consciousness without themselves being conscious. In this respect, as it moves from one thought to the next, consciousness can rely on certain capacities (for example, the recognition of complex configurations) without having to make a conscious decision about them, or even being able to do so. (p. 43, my italics)[19]

    Thus, just like communication is structurally coupled to consciousness, consciousness is structurally coupled to its living basis, mainly to the brain. Importantly, the brain cannot contribute thoughts to consciousness, and neither can consciousness contribute thoughts to communication. When communicative acts happen, the state of consciousness that was present when producing such acts is not part of that communication (of course, neither are relevant processes in the brain). Such communication presupposes the existence of consciousness without consciousness becoming part of communication. There is no causal or deterministic relationship between brain and consciousness, and neither is there such a relationship between consciousness and communications. All three systems are operationally closed and linked only by a vertical arrangement of structural coupling.

    Closing remarks

    I have reached the end of what I wanted to say about the issues of communication, consciousness and structural coupling. To me, the most fascinating element of Luhmann’s theory is its radical temporalization of the foundational elements of society into operations that disappear in the moment they occur and that must therefore be followed recursively by a similar type of operation for the respective system being able to continue its existence, be it politics, law, science, the economy, art, education, the mass media, or religion. Moreover, this approach is complicated by the fact that Luhmann also does not treat consciousness as an integrated whole but rather dissolves it into units that equally consist of temporalized elements that disappear the moment they appear. Thus, consciousness must continuously reproduce itself by connecting thoughts recursively to preceding thoughts and point to possible subsequent thoughts, ad infinitum, until its physical basis dies. Therefore, the production of the basic elements of society—communications—entirely depends on the structural coupling with a unit that is fundamentally highly unstable and fickle.


    [1] In Chris and Uta Frith’s What Makes Us Social (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2023, p. 255) one reads the truly bizarre sentence, “We conclude that meaning does not reside in single brains. Rather, it is constantly re-created through interactions between brains.”

    [2] All translations were done by ChatGPT, with occasional input by me. I asked for a rather literal approach in the translations. The German text reads: “Organismen können, soweit ihre Lebenfähigkeit in einer Umwelt gesichert ist, mit Hilfe des Nervensystems eine Selbstbeoachtung organisieren. Die Beobachtung bezieht sich ausschlieslich auf den Eigenzustand des Organismus. Das gilt auch für Gehirne jeder Art. Bewusstsein entwickelt sich, wie immer parasitär, auf dieser Realitätsbasis, aber mit der umgekehrten Tendenz, primär das zu beobachten, was es als Aussenwelt sehen kann. Bewusstsein ist mit erheblichen Anteilen seiner Aufmerksamkeit wahrnehmendes Bewusstsein und würde ohne Wahrnehmungsmöglichkeiten rasch verkümmern.”

    [3] Niklas Luhmann. 1995. Die operative Geschlossenheit psychischer und sozialer Systeme. In Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung 6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch, pp. 25-36 (p. 31). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. (Originally a presentation given in April 1991.)

    [4] Niklas Luhmann. 2012. Theory of Society. Volume 1. Translated by Rhodes Barrett. Stanford California: Stanford University Press, p. 56f.

    [5] Niklas Luhmann. 1995. Social Systems. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, p. 142. German original: Sozial Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985 (my italics).

    [6] Psychologically oriented conceptions of the social usually base their framework on individual “minds” and social cognition, while for denoting the overall process of the social a commonsensical idea of “interaction” is used (about Luhmann used to ask how precisely this “inter” was to be understood). For example, see Chris and Uta Frith, in their book What Makes us Social (Cambridge, Mass. And London: The MIT Press, 2023) assume that there are separate minds that are connected by an “interface” called “reflexion,” which is seen as the “top level of the information-processing hierarchy” (p. 1). This goes together with what they call “mentalizing,” that is “the ability [of one mind] to model the minds of others to predict what they are going to do, its causes, and its consequences for our social interactions” (p. 4). Similarly, Forgas, Crano, and Fiedler base sociability on the need to “possess a theory of mind—the capacity to understand that other people live in different subjective universes, experience different mental states, beliefs, and intentions, and that these states are only imperfectly accessible to outsiders. Having a theory of mind is absolutely essential for success in everyday human social interactions.” (Joseph P. Forgas, William D. Crano, and Klaus Fiedler. 2022. “The Psychology of Human Sociability: From Individuals to Community,” In The Psychology of Sociability: Understanding Human Attachment, ed. by the authors. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 3-21 (p. 8). Finally, Enfield and Levison noted, “Crucial elements of this [social interaction] include the ability to recognize others’ intentions through modeling the minds of others in real contexts (and to anticipate their modeling of our anticipation of their intention attribution!). These elements together form the essential equipment for formulating and interpreting actions in an interactional setting.” N. J. Enfield and Stephen C. Levison. 2006. “Introduction: Human Sociability as a New Interdisciplinary Field.” In Roots of Human Sociability: Culture, Cognition and Interaction, ed. by the authors. Oxford and New York: Berg, pp. 1-35 (p. 26f.).

    [7] Operations are the fundamental elements of social systems; they are radically temporalized. In other words, operations are events that disappear at the moment that they have occurred. They cannot be repeated; they can only be followed by other events of the same kind. At this level, systems are closed. What occurs is a “recursive enabling of [a system’s] own operations by the results of its own operations” (Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, p. 94). The “conclusion of one operation is the condition of the possibility of another [operation]” (ibid., p. 95). “At the level of its own operations, [the system] has no access into its environment, nor can systems in the environment participate in the autopoietic processes of an operationally closed system” (ibid., p. 92). In Das Recht der Gesellschaft (p. 44), Luhmann provides this definition, “Systems are denoted as operationally closed when, for the production of their own operations, they depend on the network of their own operations and, in this sense, reproduce themselves.”

    [8] Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 112).

    [9] In a less Luhmannarian language, one could say that sociologists are concerned with macro phenomena. If they start with the individual, the usual problem occurs to explain how micro (individual) actions can lead to collective (macro) phenomena. In his “Instead of a Preface to the English Edition [of Social Systems]: On the Concepts ‘Subject’ and ‘Action’”, Luhmann pointed out, “Of course, one can still say that human beings act. But since that always occurs in situations, the question remains whether and to what extent the action is attributed to the individual human being or to the situation. If one wants to bring about a decision of this question, one must observe, not the human being in the situation, but the process of attribution. Therefore actions are not ultimate ontological givens that emerge as unavoidable empirical elements that force themselves upon one in every sociological analysis” (p. xliii, my italics).

    [10] If an empirical researcher insists on an individualistic approach, a typical problem occurs: He or she can see and construct a model of the phenomenon, but he or she will not be allowed directly to observe what is assumed to happen. Moreover, if the researcher instead wants to use interviews of individuals, their answers will invariably be of doubtful validity. This is especially true when a system includes very significant proportions of informal, and partly illegal, behavior, such as is the case in Thailand’s political system.

    [11] “Was ist Kommunikation?” In Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung 6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995, pp. 113-124. The lecture was given in 1986. The English translation, “What is Communication” was published in Niklas Luhmann, Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity. Edited, with an Introduction, by William Rasch. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002, pp. 155-168.

    [12] Niklas Luhmann. 2002. “How Can the Mind Participate in Communication?” In Niklas Luhmann, Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity. Edited, with an Introduction, by William Rasch, pp. 169-184. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Niklas Luhmann. 1995. “Wie ist Bewusstsein an Kommunikation beteiligt?“ in Niklas Luhmann: Soziologische Aufklärung 6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch, pp. 37-54. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. The German text was first published in 1988.

    [13] Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society. Volume 1, p. 51. In Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, p. 275, Luhmann states that “recursively closed systems can produce their elements only by a network of these very elements.”

    [14] The German text reads, “Selbst der strukturelle Operationszusammenhang von Bewusstsein und Kommunikation ist nur eine von Moment zu Moment variable Kopplung, die die Freiheit der Systeme zur Eigenbewegung mit dem Ablauf jedes Einzelereignisses immer wieder erneuert“ (p. 31). Translation by ChatGPT.

    [15] Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society. Volume 1, p. 51.

    [16] In a footnote, Luhmann adds: “The same argument could be used to resolve the so-called reductionism debate concerning consciousness and the brain, if one accepts that the brain, too, consists of events rather than of cells” (fn. 40 on p. 38).

    [17] Niklas Luhmann. 1995. “Die operative Geschlossenheit psychischer und sozialer Systeme.” In Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung 6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch, pp. 25-36 [p. 31]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. (Originally a presentation given in April 1991.)

    [18] Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society. Volume 1, p. 56.

    [19] The English translation hides a nice German-language construction. What appears here as “the thoughts currently available to it” is “die ihm verfügbare Gedankenaktualität” in German.

  • Perhaps, readers should start this novel after its last page. There, they will find a “Discussion Guide” with eleven questions. One might get the impression that this novel was a reading assignment in a course on contemporary literature for a student who, for her assignment, chose a novel that problematizes the work of mumfluencers who use their own children as commodity for making money on Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, as well as in a range of print publications specializing on the lives of celebrities. The novel does have a didactical feel to it (including advice on friendship and love), but it is written in a fluent style that is easy to engage in (though most dialogues sound a bit artificial to me). The text jumps from character to character and mixes different points in time. But this mixture is well-arranged, and I never lost track of the plot, which is transparent: A Nigerian female baby is transplanted by her father to London after her mother dies during childbirth. In a hospital, the father meets a white pediatric nurse who falls in love with the baby girl. Since the father does not know how to handle the baby, the nurse begins to care for her—first part-time, then full-time, and eventually as the man’s wife. Over time, the white stepmother commercializes the child and her social relationships. As adolescence begins, the girl becomes rebellious and breaks with her previous life. She then attempts not only to establish her own identity but also to save her younger sister from becoming another victim of the stepmother’s business ambitions. This leads to a veritable legal and social mud fight with both her stepmother and her father. The novel closes with a rather sentimental finale.

    Since the cast of characters seems to be arranged like a role play, here is a list of the main characters.

    Nkem: Living in the city of Onitsha in Nigeria, he (a man with a big ego, repeatedly described as such in the book, but with little competence or sense of responsibility) falls madly in love with Kainene. They marry. Kainene, who had suffered three miscarriages, dies at the birth of their daughter whom she had named Aṅụrị, meaning “happiness,” “joy,” or “rejoice.” Nkem is devastated. His emotional loss has two consequences. First, it erects a wall between him and his daughter. Even when she had grown up, looking at her would not make him see his daughter but only Kainene. Second, he moves with the baby girl to London, where his sister, Nneoma, lives. One day, Aṅụrị becomes ill. Nkem does not know how to handle this. His sister urges him to take her to a hospital.

    Ophelia: She is a pediatric nurse at the hospital and falls in love with the tiny baby. Since it is obvious that Nkem cannot handle his daughter, he hires Ophelia to look after her on a part-time basis. Part-time develops into full-time, turns into a love relationship, which ends in them marrying. Since she is white with blond hair, her parents are less than thrilled about their daughter marrying a Nigerian. Anyway, Ophelia takes good care of both. But then she discovers that popularity and money can be gained as a “mumfluencers” using her child as a commodity. This transition happens gradually, as Ophelia’s growing professionalization—through monetization and branding—begins to affect her relationship with Aṅụrị. During the early period, she could still be with her stepmother when she prepared herself for an online post. At some point, however, Ophelia hires stylists to do this work. As soon as they enter her room, Aṅụrị must leave, causing increasing emotional distance between them.

    Aṅụrị: Now 25 years old and living independently in her own flat, she has carved out a life far removed from her upbringing. She operates a small shop styling hair for a few African customers. In addition, she produces and markets scented candles that become much sought after. She is in a protracted legal battle with Ophelia because she wants all her images removed from all online sources where her stepmother had posted them. In this struggle, she is expertly helped by a clever African female lawyer, Gloria. At least as important to her is to save her little sister, Noelle, born to Nkem and Ophelia, from suffering the same fate she did. Noelle already shows signs of psychological distress, most notably recurring bedwetting—an indicator, perhaps, of the emotional strain caused by her mother’s online commodification. Aṅụrị wants her to see her own therapist (she used to be an alcoholic), Ammah, and even wants Noelle to move in with her.

    Simi and Loki: They are Aṅụrị’s closest friends since school days. “Loki, alongside Simi, became Aṅụrị’s chosen family” (p. 49). Simi is a Yoruba woman, while Loki belongs to a wealthy and well-known banking family from New Orleans and grew up in New York. The author uses the relationship of the three to illustrate a bond of unbreakable, eternal friendship. Given that Aṅụrị is the one burdened by severe problems, the relationship is rather asymmetrical. Simi and Loki play an enormously important part in trying to keep Aṅụrị on track, and especially away from alcohol.

    Christian (Chidili) and Abe: They are the love interests of Aṅụrị and Simi, respectively. Both play only marginal roles. Christian is introduced to show that Aṅụrị’s long years of external demands and gratifications, along with her constant exposure as a commodity to strangers, have left her with fundamental doubts about real relationships. Even at age 25, she is still horrified by the idea that a person could be interested not in her as an individual but in her as a public image. Yet, when Aṅụrị is about to surrender the fight and tells her friends in her flat that she has had enough and will give up, it is Christian who has the decisive idea how to turn an apparent defeat into an eventual triumph. Luckily, Loki’s social standing enables him to set in motion the game-changing approach Christian had proposed. Simi formally introduces Abe to her friends only in this meeting, after she had hesitated for quite some time. Aṅụrị, Simi, and Loki are of similar ages. So, the fact that Christian and Abe are added to their close friendship circle might indicate that some transition was taking place—from a pure friendship to members beginning to form their own families, which inevitably operate beyond the original ties of friendship. This did not jeopardize their friendship but rather marked a shift—from youthful intimacy to a more mature phase aligned with the realities of adult life.

    At the end, having read and watched Aṅụrị’s interview that grew out of Christian’s suggestion, Ophelia ends her part of the struggle and discontinues her online presence.

    Editorial help from ChatGPT is acknowledged.

    MHN

    Nonthaburi, Thailand

    17 May 2025

    Earlier brief descriptions of books in this series:

    Anne Berest. 2023. The Postcard. A Novel. New York Europa Editions.   475 pp.  The original French publication appeared in 2021, entitled La card postale, at the Editions Grasset & Fasquelle. It was translated by Tina Kover.

    Michael Frank. 2023. One Hundred Saturdays: Stella Levi and the Search for a Lost World. Artwork by Maira Kalman. London: Souvenir Press.  215 pp.

    Filip Müller. 1979. Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers. Literary collaboration by Helmut Freitag. Edited and translated by Susanne Flatauer. New York: Stein and Day. New German edition 2022, Sonderbehandlung: Meine Jahre in den Krematorien und Gaskammern von Auschwitz. Deutsche Bearbeitung von Helmut Freitag. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.  320 pp.

    Angus Deaton. 2023. Economics in America: An Immigrant Economist Explores the Land of Inequality. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.   271 pp.

    Charlotte Wood. 2019. The Weekend. A Novel. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. 262 pp.

    Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes. 2019. The Light that Failed: Why the West is Losing the Fight for Democracy. New York: Pegasus Books.   247 pp.

    Laurent Mauvignier. 2023. The Birthday Party. London: Fitzcarraldo Editions.   499 pp.  French original Histoires de la nuit, Les Editions de Minuit, 2020. Translated by Daniel Levin Becker.

    Margaret O’Mara. 2019. The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America. New York: Penguin Press.   496 pp.

    Christopher R. Browning. 2005. The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939—March 1942. With contributions by Jürgen Matthäus. Published by the University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, and Yad Vashem, Jerusalem. London: Arrow Books.

    615 pp.

    Celeste Ng. 2022. Our Missing Hearts. London: Abacus Books.  335 pp.

    Ingeborg Rapoport. 2021. Meine ersten drei Leben: Erinnerungen. [My First Three Lives: Memoirs.] Berlin: Bild und Heimat.  415 pp. First pocketbook edition 2002. Original edition 1997.

    Jan-Werner Müller. 2022. Democracy Rules. Penguin Books. xvi+236 pp.

    Seichō Matsumoto. 2022 [Third edition 2023]. Tokyo Express [Ten to Sen, Points and Lines]. Translated by Jesse Kirkwood. Dublin: Penguin Books.   149 pp.

    Itamar Vieira Junior. 2023. Crooked Plow. Translated by Johnny Lorenz. London and New York: Verso.   276 pp. Originally published in Brazilian Portuguese in 2018, entitled Torto Arado.

    Heather Cox Richardson. 2023. Democracy Awakening: Notes on the State of America. London: WH Allen.  xvii+286 pp.

    Celeste Ng. 2017. Little Fires Everywhere. A Novel. New York: Penguin Press.  338 pp.

    Paul Lynch. 2023. Prophet Song. London: Oneworld Publications.   309 pp.

    Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. 2023. Tyranny of the Minority: How to Reverse an Authoritarian Turn and Forge a Democracy for All. Dublin: Viking.   388 pp.

    Luke Jennings. 2018. Killing Eve: Codename Villanelle. London: John Murray.   217 pp. (Originally published in serial form in 2014.) Volume 2: No Tomorrow. London: John Murray. 2018.   248 pp. Volume 3: Die For Me [UK: Endgame]. London: John Murray. 2020.   228 pp.

    Adelle Waldman. 2024. Help Wanted. A Novel. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.  276 pp.

    Selva Almada. 2024. Not a River. Translated by Annie McDermott. Edinburgh: Charco Press. 93 pp. / Ia Genberg. 2024. The Details. Translated by Kira Josefsson. London: Wildfire. 151 pp. /

    Jente Posthuma. 2023. What I’d Rather Not Think About. Melbourne, London, Minneapolis: Scribe.  203 pp.

    Jenny Erpenbeck. 2024. Kairos. Translated by Michael Hofmann. New York and London: New Directions (W.W. Norton).   304 pp.  German original: Kairos. Roman. München: Penguin Verlag. Original edition 2021, softcover 2023. 379 pp.

    Paul Murray. 2024. The Bee Sting. London: Penguin Books. 645 pages. First published in 2023 by Hamish Hamilton. Shortlisted for the Booker Prize 2023.   643 pp.

    Charlotte Wood. 2023. Stone Yard Devotional. London: Sceptre.  297 pp.

    Samantha Harvey. 2024. Orbital. Dublin: Vintage.   136 pp.

    Yael Van Der Wouden. 2024. The Safekeep. A Novel. Dublin: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Books. 262 pages.

    Rachel Kushner. 2024. Creation Lake. London: Jonathan Cape.   407 pp.

    Anne Serre. 2023. A Leopard-Skin Hat. Translated from French by Mark Hutchinson. London: Lolli Editions. Originally published by Éditions Mercure de France in 2008 as Un chapeau léopard. This English translation first published as New Directions Paperbook 1574 in 2023.   136 pp.

    Vincenzo Latronico. 2025. Perfection. Translated by Sophie Hughes. London: Fitzcarraldo Editions.  113 pp.

    Dahlia de la Cerda. 2024. Reservoir Bitches. Translated by Heather Cleary and Julia Sanches. Melbourne, London, Minneapolis: Scribe.   184 pages

    Miranda July. 2024. All Fours. New York: Riverhead Books.  326 pp.

    Liz Moore. 2024. The God of the Woods. London: The Borough Press. 435 pages

    Slavoj Žižek. 2023. Freedom: A Disease Without Cure. London et al: Bloomsbury Academic. 320 pages

  • Admittedly, I am not normally a reader of Slavoj Žižek. I have only watched or read a couple of interviews with him. Nevertheless, I bought this book because I am interested in its topic and thought that he might have something interesting to say about it. Readers should be warned that the title is misleading, since only the first 52 pages directly deal with the topic indicated. The rest is a collection of texts and appendices on a variety of unrelated issues.

    Žižek, like many observers and actors, sees the world as facing a multifaceted crisis, including digital control, viral infections, and global warming. He puts his hope in philosophy as a means of finding solutions. Quoting Alain Badiou, he writes that philosophy is tasked to “corrupt the youth” (p. 3), i.e., to alienate them from the dominant ideological-political order. As Goethe put it, “None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free” (ibid.; cited from Wahlverwandtschaften). Only by studying philosophy, Žižek argues, “will we find a way out of our sad predicament” (ibid.). This begins with analyzing the notion of “freedom,” which in liberal-democratic societies may be only subjectively felt, while “the establishment controls” our thinking (ibid.). Kant and Hegel, according to the author, saw freedom as a “disease,” a condition inherent to humanity, requiring discipline and education. “Discipline or training changes animal nature into human nature” (p. 4; Kant, “Lectures on Pedagogy”). The inherent “savagery” in human nature necessitates constraints. This eventually leads to a “hegemonic discourse of power” (p. 7), which must be resisted through language, not only in its formal structure but also its “non-intended ambiguities and wordplays” (ibid.), which create a space for resistance.

    The everyday notion of freedom has been called into question by modern neuroscience, raising the issue of whether humans are truly free, or if our actions are determined by unconscious neural processes. Is there such a thing as free will, and can it coexist with scientific determinism? (p. 9f.). In the past, the biological foundations of conscious choice were acknowledged without assuming they impacted the content of choices. Today, however, neurological and digital means of control have expanded to such a degree that “the liberal notion of a free individual becomes obsolete and even meaningless” (p. 10).

    From this, Žižek derives five questions: (1) Is the subconscious a site of determinism or freedom? (2) Does brain science leave room for freedom, or must we accept determinism? (3) Do modern social structures like the market, state, and democracy support or obstruct freedom? (4) Does the digital universe give rise to new, opaque forms of domination? (5) What is the impact of the ecological crisis on our freedom?

    At the end of this introductory section, Žižek complains that capitalism involved “permanent self-revolutionizing” (p. 11), which has led to fundamental changes during the past fifty years. Somehow, he seems to be overcome by nostalgia for periods of life in which hardly anything ever changed, or at a much slower pace. Thus, he wonders, “perhaps, the time has come to re-conceive Communism as a counter-revolution, as an effort to establish a new stable order” (ibid., original italics). [I could not make out whether this remark was meant seriously or merely served to indicate the strength of domination that is exerted by modern world structures, leaving little room for individual choices, or put them under immense pressure of adaptation. M.N.]

    The main part of the book, “Freedom as Such,” is divided into several sub-sections:

    1. Freedom and Its Discontents

    The author begins with the difference between “freedom” and “liberty,” referencing Wikipedia and then using Hegel to distinguish between “abstract freedom” (doing whatever one wants) and “concrete freedom” (freedom embedded in social norms and structures). “My freedom is only actual as freedom within a certain social space regulated by rules and prohibitions” (p. 19). The author’s example is that one can walk along a street without having to be afraid of an attack. And if one happened, one could be sure that the attacker, if caught, would be punished. In short, “a domain of rules is needed as the very terrain of our freedoms” (p. 19). Therefore, “a social space is not just the space of what is permitted but also the space of what is repressed, excluded from public space…” (p. 22). A domain of rules thus becomes the very terrain of our freedoms. Moreover, notions of freedom are historically contingent. Today, freedom is often equated with the capacity to choose. But this ignores how the available choices are framed and which are privileged (p. 25). With respect to Hegel, the author notes that there can be situations were “abstract freedom” needs to be adopted. And he asks, “Are we not more and more approaching a situation in which millions of people think that they have to act freely (violate the rules) in order to protect their liberty?” (ibid.). He includes “the Rightist populist revolts” (p. 26) in this context: “Did the Trumpian crowd not invade The Capitol on January 6, 2021, to protect their liberty?” (p. 26). One might then assume that the spread of populism is indeed a revolt against elitist rule that has imposed socio-political conditions on the people and that these people use populism to recover their oppressed liberty. Žižek asks, “Is our only choice the one between parliamentary elections controlled by corrupted elites and uprisings controlled by the populist Right?” (ibid.).

    Somewhat controversially, Žižek claims that living under a “moderately authoritarian regime” may offer clarity: one knows the rules and how far one can dissent. [Singapore springs to mind. M.N.] By contrast, democracy produces disorientation. People may value the appearance of choice more than the burden of decision (p. 27). “The whole point of law is to regulate its violations: without violations, there would have been no need for the law” (p. 29).

    Even in areas governed by facts, such as science, choices are not guaranteed. People can reject evidence despite knowing it. Žižek concludes that “true freedom is when we choose the contours of our “liberty” that will determine our entire life” (p. 34).

    Freedom to Say NO

    Freedom involves the ability to negate: to say no to one’s own inclinations. Quoting Benjamin Libet, Žižek says, “the ultimate act of freedom is to renounce what one desires most” (p. 35). Yet, such freedom may be illusory—a “user’s illusion”—concealing that actions are determined by unconscious processes (p. 36).

    2. Is There Such a Thing as ‘Free Will’?

    Žižek interrogates “deterministic naturalism”: the idea that we do what we will, but what we will is determined (p. 37). He revisits Libet, suggesting that consciousness might have veto power, only to concede this too may be predetermined. One possible rescue is contingency: decisions made in a space of randomness. But this introduces dualism, which Žižek rejects. Instead, he appeals to the emergence of “higher levels” of reality, such as social and spiritual domains, arising from physical processes yet possessing their own logic and causality (p. 40). However, there is a twist: “is the relative autonomy of the higher spheres an actual fact of nature or is it just a simplification that pertains to the limitations of our descriptions of reality, so that in a full description of nature no mention of higher levels would be needed?” (p. 41). He refers to Daniel Dennett’s dual-level theory (physical base and design level). [This sounds like a version of “structural coupling”. M.N.]. Dennett’s model allows higher-level investigation without denying the physical base. Dennett, however, is faulted for ignoring evolution and teleology. Žižek asks, “Is then the ‘teleological’ causality of motivation (I did something because I aimed to achieve some goal) just an epiphenomenon, a mental translation of a process which can (also) be fully described at a purely physical level of natural determinism, or does such a ‘teleological’ causation effectively possess a power of its own and fill in the gap in direct physical causality?” (p. 44).

    Rewriting the Past

    Pages 48 to 51 examine Althusser’s notion of ideological subject-formation. An open question is whether an uncanny subject precedes this subjectivization (p. 51).

    Beyond the Transcendental

    Reality, Žižek writes, is never given directly but through symbolic frames—the “transcendental” (p. 52), a view that closely aligns with epistemological constructivism. Our self-perception as free agents is not just a necessary illusion but the precondition of scientific knowledge. He criticizes Sabine Hossenfelder (a German theoretical physicist and proponent of “superdeterminism,” meaning that all human action and thought have physical causes) dismissing free will as “non-scientific nonsense,” siding instead with Michael Egner, who argues that if free will is not real, human thought loses access to truth (ibid.). [Readers interested in a comprehensive statement of determinism by a determinist may turn to Robert M. Sapolsky. 2023. Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will. New York: Penguin. M.N.].

    With this, Žižek’s direct discussion of freedom ends.

    MHN

    Nonthaburi, Thailand

    10 May 2025

    Editorial help from ChatGPT is acknowledged

  • 435 pages

    At 435 pages, The God of the Woods is a rather long mystery novel, divided into eight parts. Each part contains short sections headlined by character names. There are eight in total, five of them women. Louise has 18 entries, Tracy 15, Alice 17, Judyta 30, and Barbara 1. Among the men, Jacob, Carl, and Victor have a combined 14 entries. Key characters such as T.J., Peter Van Laar, John Paul McLellan, and Denny Hayes are present in many sections, though they are cast in supporting roles.

    The narrative spans from the 1950s to August 1975, with a strong focus on the years 1961 and 1975. Flashbacks are used extensively to contextualize current events. Each section’s header includes a date range, with the relevant moment in boldface. Despite the book’s length, the fast pace, driven largely by dialogue rather than narration, makes for engaging reading. For me, I looked forward to my two nightly hours with this book; about 100 pages from the end, the suspense became so intense that I could hardly put it down.

    The story is set in a summer camp for children between the ages of eight and sixteen, located on the Van Laar family’s forested estate near a lake and mountains. One of the camp’s highlights is the survival days, when small groups of children must survive in the forest using the skills they have learned, with minimal adult supervision. The Van Laars are a wealthy banking family. Their daughter Barbara—a rebellious, punk-style teenager—is usually averse to attending camp, though she resides on the estate. This year, she chooses to join, arriving a day late. Her bunkmate, Tracy, is a shy girl who tends to stay on the fringes of social interaction. Surprisingly, Barbara becomes her only friend, and later, Tracy reflects that what she liked most about the camp was the way Barbara helped her become a more confident teenager.

    Barbara’s sudden disappearance sparks the central plot. Louise, her cabin supervisor, is the first to notice she is missing. This event reawakens old traumas, particularly the 1961 disappearance of Barbara’s younger brother, Peter (nicknamed “Bear”), whose body was never found. He had been the emotional center of his mother Alice’s life. Barbara’s case leads to the reexamination of Peter’s. Local police, led by Denny Hayes and his newly appointed female investigator Judyta (“Judy”) Luptack, take charge. Judyta, from a Polish immigrant family, unexpectedly becomes a central figure in the investigation, despite being new to the job. Her rapid professional development may strike some readers as overly convenient.

    The novel unfolds along two investigative tracks: finding Barbara and uncovering the truth about Bear’s disappearance. Ultimately, Bear’s death is explained, though the manner in which the police discover his remains feels somewhat contrived. As for Barbara, Liz Moore plants red herrings: when her love interest is found with a bag of her bloody clothes, suspicion arises. Readers, however, know Barbara had injured herself while gutting a dead squirrel during the survival exercise, and T.J., the camp director (daughter of Vic, whom she succeeded as the director), treated her wound and disposed of the bloody clothing. T.J., who had taken care of Barbara like a younger sister (or perhaps even like the daughter she might never have) when the Van Laar parents had no time to do so, then misleads the police by suggesting the person with the clothes may have killed her. This contradiction might make readers suspect that T.J. is hiding something or protecting someone.

    What happened to Barbara? Was she murdered, did she run away, or did she simply get lost in the forest? In the end, it falls to the determined but inexperienced Judyta Luptack to unravel both past and present and uncover what really happened to Peter and Barbara.

    The assistance of ChatGPT is gratefully acknowledged.

    MHN

    Nonthaburi, Thailand

    29 April 2025